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Abstract: The Stability Growth Pact and the 3% rule did not prevent countries from running 
large deficits. Countries in the EMU administrate fiscal policies differently, despite the 
existence of a common quantitative goal. The main focus of this work project is to study 
differences in the fiscal dynamics of eight EMU countries and assess the role of political 
variables in shaping those dynamics. We find that elections negatively affect government 
revenue in Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Germany. Expenditure, on the other hand, 
responds positively to incoming elections in Portugal, Italy, France and Netherlands, and 
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1. Introduction 
 
Fiscal discipline is a challenge for most countries. Beyond its macroeconomic effects, deficit 
reduction policies also have political consequences. The study of fiscal dynamics has renewed 
importance for Eurozone countries - with no discretionary power over monetary policy, fiscal 
policy is the main instrument for cyclical stabilization, as Buti et al. (2003) point out. 
In this work project, we assess fiscal dynamics in eight EMU countries making use of 
quarterly data from 1999 to 2015. A pertinent research issue is whether policy differences are 
attenuated after political variables are taken into account in the model, and to describe how 
political variables themselves affect different countries. A Structural Vector Autoregressive 
model following the Blanchard-Perotti identification scheme is estimated for each of the 
countries in order to retrieve the responses of government revenue and spending to 
unanticipated fiscal shocks. The impact of political variables on government revenue and 
expenditure is also quantified. Although no evidence of partisan effects is found for the 
countries in sample, a statistically significant electoral effect is present. Incorporating the 
timing of elections into the model approximates countries that had similar initial dynamics.  
This work project is organized as follows – Section two provides a brief literature review, 
summarizing the current state of the art. Data properties are described in section three. The 
methodology is explained in section four. Section five presents the main empirical results and 
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2. Related Literature 
The Maastricht Eligibility Criteria and, later, the Stability Growth Pact were seen as an 
incentive to achieve low levels of public deficit and have budgetary positions converge across 
countries in the EMU. After accession, however, some convergence fatigue might have set in1 
and compromised fiscal sustainability. In reality, after the third stage of the EMU, some 
countries faced large and growing deficits. Southern European countries, in particular, were 
accused of engaging in irresponsible behavior through excessive lending, allegedly made 
possible by the common currency’s credibility. However, although these countries face 
ongoing Excessive Deficit Procedures, almost every country of the EMU has breached the 3% 
rule at some point. What is the dynamic response of fiscal variables, and how does it differ 
across EMU countries? Are differences attenuated when political factors are accounted for? 
Four main different theoretical hypotheses attempt to describe the intertemporal relation 
between public revenues and expenditures - the spend-tax hypothesis, the tax-spend 
hypothesis, the fiscal synchronization hypothesis and the institutional separation hypothesis. 
The spend-tax hypothesis argues that changes in expenditure lead to changes in taxes. 
Conversely, under the tax-spend hypothesis, changes in tax revenues motivate changes in 
expenditures. If positive changes in taxation lead to positive changes in government spending 
and vice-versa, the ‘starve the beast’ hypothesis is verified. If, on the other hand, there is an 
inverse relation between taxes and spending, the fiscal illusion hypothesis is verified. The 
third view, the fiscal synchronization hypothesis, suggests that policymakers decide on 
government spending and revenue simultaneously. Finally, under the institutional separation 
hypothesis, decisions concerning spending and revenue are independent from each other and 
there is an absence of any causal relation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  	  Harden et. al, 1995 
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Typically, empirical studies on this matter focus on a single country set up and rely on co-
integration procedures, error correction models and Granger causality tests. Payne (2003) 
provides an extensive survey of the empirical literature on the subject at national and 
subnational levels, with the majority of studies located on the United States. Romer and 
Romer (2009) use the narrative approach and find a positive effect of tax cuts on spending, 
but no evidence of the ‘starve the beast hypothesis’ for the United States is found. Kollias and 
Paleologou (2006) use a VECM framework for each of the EU15 countries during the 1960-
2002 period and find evidence supporting the fiscal synchronization hypothesis for Denmark, 
Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. Austria, Belgium and Germany are in 
conformity with the institutional separation hypothesis. Italy and Spain verify the tax-and-
spend hypothesis. The authors find evidence that lower taxes lead to higher expenditure for 
Finland and France.  
Recently, there has been a growing body of literature analyzing the effects of fiscal policy 
shocks with the recourse to the Vector Autoregressive models. The use of identification 
schemes and a Structural Vector Autoregressive framework enables the separation of true 
policy shocks from cyclical reactions. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use extra-model 
information on elasticities of fiscal variables to output and conclude that unanticipated tax 
increases affect output negatively. Their identification methodology has, to some extent, 
become the benchmark for this type of studies. Other existing identification schemes include 
the recursive identification (Sims, 1980), the sign-restrictions approach (Uhlig, 2005) and the 
event-study approach (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998). Caldara and Kamps (2008) provide a brief 
explanation of these identification methods and show how results on fiscal multipliers diverge 
depending on the chosen identification method. Afonso and Claeys (2008), through the 
estimation of a Vector Autoregressive Model and the construction of an indicator of structural 
balance for France, Germany, Portugal and Spain, conclude that there is a procyclical bias in 
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fiscal policies – governments cut taxes during booms, but these cuts are not accompanied by 
cuts in spending, leading to deficits when economic conditions worsen.  
Another strand of the literature concerns the political economy of fiscal policy. Political 
factors and the institutional environment will ultimately influence how fiscal policy is 
conducted. Harden et. al (1994) emphasize the role of institutions in the budget process as 
determinant for fiscal performance. The timing, duration, composition and degree of success 
of a fiscal adjustment may also be influenced by economic and political-institutional factors, 
some of them being political stability, the existence of organized interest groups or the degree 
of transparency (Mierau, 2007). Mulas-Granados (2003) examines the political and economic 
determinants behind EU-15 countries following different fiscal strategies in the period from 
1990 to 2001. He finds that economic conditions, fragmented decision-making, government 
size, ideology and closeness to elections all affect budget composition in adjustment and non-
adjustment years. In Eurozone countries, fiscal policy is the only instrument to influence 
voters’ perceptions prior to elections. In this sense, it is reasonable to expect some degree of 
political manipulation to occur. Indeed, Buti and van den Noord (2003), Mink and de Haan 
(2006) and Efthyvoulou (2012) find evidence of electoral fiscal policy manipulation in the 
Eurozone during the early years and thereafter.  These studies make use either of a qualitative 
approach or univariate econometric analysis and do not take into account the 
contemporaneous and lagged relations between variables. Testing political economy 
hypotheses using time series methodologies is not common heretofore.  
In sum, although there is considerable literature that assesses the spending and taxation nexus 
and the determinants of fiscal policy in European Union countries, testing for the relevance of 
politico-institutional factors as determinants of fiscal dynamics has been an overlooked topic. 
This work project combines the aforementioned two strands of literature, making use of the 
powerful time series methodology to shed light on the role of political factors in fiscal policy. 
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3. Data  
Quarterly data was extracted from Eurostat from the first quarter of 1999 to the first quarter of 
2015 for the following countries – Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Netherlands, Spain, 
Portugal and Italy.2  Estimates of fiscal elasticities are from the OECD.3 Political variables 
were obtained from the Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set until 2013 and 
updated to 2015 using complementary information from the Adam Carr’s Election Archive. 
More information on data description and sources can be found on Appendix 1. The use of 
quarterly data allows for more degrees of freedom in estimation and is essential for the 
identification assumption that considers fiscal variables do not react to output shocks within 
the quarter.  The use of high frequency data is thus recommended since it allows for a more 
accurate identification of the effects of fiscal shocks.   
The first step of the analysis consists in examining the time series properties of the data. In 
this sense, Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests were performed to test for non-
stationarity. The ADF test was performed using a constant and no trend and the choice of the 
number of lags was made according to the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). For all 
countries, the null of unit root cannot be rejected at 5% significance level. When expressed in 
first-differences, all series are stationary. Often in the literature, VARs are estimated in levels 
with the underlying assumption of a cointegration relationship between variables. If that is not 
the case, the model will be misspecified and estimates of the impulse response functions will 
be biased. In this sense, the Johansen’s maximum likelihood cointegration rank test is run. For 
every country the results do not reject the null of no cointegration amongst the variables in 
levels.  The model is then specified in first-differences. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Total government expenditure, total government revenue and GDP were originally in nominal terms and non-
seasonally adjusted. The series were seasonally adjusted using X-13, deflated using the GDP deflator and log-
transformed. 
3 See OECD “Estimates for EU Budget Surveillance” (2014). More recently, ECFIN has published “Tax 
Revenue Elasticities Corrected for  Policy Estimates in the EU” (November, 2015). These are revenue-to-base, 
and not revenue-to-output elasticities. For this reason, and to use the same source for revenue and expenditure 
elasticities, we opt for the 2014 OECD Estimates.	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4. Methodology 
The baseline empirical model consists on a three-variable Vector Autoregressive Model of 
revenue, expenditure and GDP, all expressed in first differences and log-transformed. The 
model in reduced form can be presented as: 
𝑦! = 𝐴 𝐿 𝑦!!! + 𝑢!   (1) 
where A(L) is a lag polynomial of order p, yt=(Δtt,Δgt,Δxt), E[ut]=0 and E[utu’s]=0 for t ≠ s. A 
constant and intervention dummies to control for the beginning of the economic and financial 
crisis were included. The number of lags p used in each model was chosen using the Schwarz 
Information Criterion, with a maximum of four lags imposed. Tests for autocorrelation, 
normality of the residuals, heteroskedasticity and parameter stability were performed in order 
to assure model adequacy, presented on Appendix 3. 
If the VAR is stable, it is invertible and has a Wold Moving Average representation that 
expresses the vector of endogenous variables as a function of past shocks in the system.  
!!!! ! !!!!,
!!!!!!!
   (2) 
The model can be presented as a function only of unexpected structural innovations et by 
imposing some restrictions. Structural disturbances, or innovations, are assumed to be 
uncorrelated and their covariance matrix diagonal. In order to identify the model, at least nine 
restrictions are needed. The assumption of orthogonality of structural shocks imposes six 
restrictions. We impose the remaining three restrictions following the Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) approach. That is, information from external institutions is used so that discretionary 
policy changes are treated as unexpected policy shocks and are separated from automatic 
stabilizers effects. This way, one is able to extract the ‘pure’ policy effect. The underlying 
logic is that unexpected movements in fiscal variables happen either because of automatic 
stabilizers or discretionary policy changes. In this identification scheme, discretionary policy 
changes correspond to the structural shocks. The effects of automatic stabilizers are accounted 
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for through the use of elasticities. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) express the relationship 
between the reduced form and structural form shocks as follows:  
𝑡! = 𝑎!𝑥! + 𝑎!𝑒!
! + 𝑒!!
𝑔! = 𝑏!𝑥! + 𝑏!𝑒!! + 𝑒!
!
𝑥! = 𝑐!𝑡! + 𝑐!𝑔! + 𝑒!!
    (3) 
Where (tt gt xt) are the reduced form shocks and (ett egt ext) are the structural shocks for 
government revenue, expenditure and output, respectively. Expressing this relation in matrix 









  (4) 
 
Unemployment-related spending is cyclically sensitive and is included in our measure of 
government spending. Thus, contrary to Blanchard and Perotti, b1 is not set to zero, as their 
assumption that spending does not react to changes in output within the quarter does not apply 
in this case. Values for a1 and b1 are computed using the latest OECD Surveillance Estimates, 
with appropriate adjustment. 4  The final restriction consists in the assumption that tax 
decisions are made prior to spending decisions (a2=0) or the inverse (b2=0). We estimate both 
models and found differences in resulting IRFs negligible. For the sake of space, only the 
model where we assume tax decisions are taken first is presented.  The used elasticity 
estimates are presented in Appendix 1. With these restrictions, the model is exactly identified 
and one is able to retrieve the impulse response functions and infer on the differences in fiscal 
dynamics across countries.  
It is reasonable to think the ideological stance of the party in government or the run up to 
elections both can influence spending or taxation levels. One would expect left cabinets to run 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The revenue elasticity measure uses the aggregated tax elasticity measure provided in the report multiplied by 
the share of tax revenue on total government revenue. The expenditure elasticity measure is attained multiplying 
the share of unemployment related spending in expenditure by the output elasticity of unemployment related 
spending.  	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higher spending and taxes in general, as well as higher spending and lower taxes before 
elections. If these factors matter, the baseline model, which ignores them, suffers from 
omitted variable bias. Thus, political variables are added exogenously into the model and their 
impact is analyzed in three ways – first, we check if the sign and statistical significance of the 
coefficients in the reduced form VAR are appropriate; second, the cumulative dynamic 
multipliers are computed from the reduced form VAR to see how a change in the political 
variable impacts the fiscal variables along time.5; third, the structural model with the new 
exogenous variables is re-estimated and resulting IRFs are compared with the baseline case. 
Accumulated IRFs present the responses of the variables in levels and are originally 
computed as the responses to one standard deviation shocks in revenue and spending. In order 
to express the shocks in percentages, allowing for a more intuitive reading of the results, the 
accumulated impulse response functions are divided by the standard deviation of the 
structural shock.6 We investigate the effects of a positive spending shock and of a negative 
revenue shock. Focusing on a negative revenue shock allows for a more interesting 
interpretation of dynamics, as both responses – spending increase or tax decrease – can be 
seen as a reaction to a shift away from budgetary equilibria. This is possible since IRFs are 
symmetric in sign. The response to a negative shock is simply the symmetric of the response 
to a positive shock. 
 
The expanded VAR can be expressed as 
𝑦! = 𝐴 𝐿 𝑦!!! + 𝛿!𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐! + 𝛿!𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡! + 𝑢! (5) 
The inclusion of exogenous variables has no impact on the identification process. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  We compute the cumulative dynamic multipliers to obtain the responses of the variables in levels instead of 
first-differences. As the dependent variable is specified in logarithms and the innovation is in levels, multiplying 
the coefficient by 100 yields an approximation of the response in percentage points.	  
6	  This is, responses to a shock in spending were divided by the standard deviation of the spending shock. The 
same applies for responses to shocks in revenue. Information on estimated standard deviations and structural 
factorizations can be found on the Technical Appendix.	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5. Empirical Results 
The results for the baseline and expanded models are presented below. The inclusion of the 
partisan dummy was not statistically significant for any country. We tried including different 
political indicators, including whether cabinet posts or parliamentarians supporting the 
government were majoritarian left-wing. None was significant. Consequently, the 
partisanship indicator was dropped from the analysis.  
The electoral dummy was defined having in mind anticipation effects – it is unlikely that 
changes in spending and taxation in the hope of reaping electoral benefits occur in the same 
quarter as the election date, as fiscal policy decisions take some time to plan, implement and 
come into fruition. So we set the dummy to 1 in the four quarters prior to the election quarter. 
Panel 1 of Figure 1 synthesizes the countries’ dynamics twenty quarters after a 1% positive 
shock in government spending or a -1% shock in government revenue. We can see that the 
signs of the government spending responses to an unanticipated contraction in revenue are 
different. Southern European countries - Italy, Portugal, Spain -, along with France, increase 
spending when faced with a negative shock in revenue. This is in line with the ‘fiscal illusion’ 
hypothesis – taxpayers do not fully perceive the cost of government and demand greater 
spending.  The remaining countries – Belgium, Austria, Netherlands and Germany – adjust 
spending negatively, moving toward deficit containment. This is line with the ‘starve the 
beast’ hypothesis. On the other hand, when government spending expands unexpectedly, 
Southern Europe countries, along with Germany and Austria increase revenue, whereas 
France, Belgium and Netherlands have the opposite reaction.  It is noticeable that Southern 
European countries have distinct dynamics from other countries in sample, being located in 
the same quadrant. It is also important to note that, as the co-integration hypothesis is 
rejected, it is not possible to infer about the existence and direction of causality between 
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revenue and spending. We focus on adjustments dynamics – this is, given a discretionary 
change in one side of the budget, we analyze how the other side responds. 
Panel 2 of Figure 1 presents the dynamics when the electoral variable is taken into account in 
the model specification. The inclusion of the electoral variable brings responses of countries 
with initial similar dynamics closer, as can be seen for Portugal and Spain. There are no 
changes in the signs of the responses, and very few changes in magnitudes, except in the case 
of Germany and Spain. A better depiction of these movements can be seen in Figure 2.  
For Germany, it is possible to see that the inclusion of the electoral dummy makes revenue 
more responsive to a positive shock in spending. Spending, on the other hand, is less 
responsive to a negative shock in revenue when elections are taken into account. This is, a 
positive shock in spending causes a larger expansion in revenue. A negative shock in revenue 
causes spending to contract less than it normally would. 
As for Spain, the inclusion of the electoral dummy makes revenue less expansive to positive 
shocks in spending, and spending more expansive given a negative shock in revenue. These 
movements are also seen for Portugal and Italy. It is interesting to find the inclusion of the 
electoral dummy causes a clear shift away from budgetary equilibrium in the case of Southern 
European countries, but partially enhances consolidation for Germany. A possible explanation 
for this that could be explored in the future would be that voters reward the incumbent 
differently in each country. 
In order to quantify the effect of the inclusion of the electoral dummy, Table 1 presents the 
estimated coefficients on the reduced form model. We can observe upcoming elections have a 
negative impact on revenue change in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Portugal and Spain. An 
increase in spending is found in the cases of Italy, Portugal, France and the Netherlands. A 
decrease in spending is found for Germany.  
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The percentage impact on total government revenue and total government expenditure is 
presented in Figures 3 and 4. Tables 2 and 3 provide complementary information to the 
understanding of the graphics. From there, it is possible to see that the immediate impact of 
an upcoming election on total government revenue is of -0,7% for Belgium, -1,5% for 
Portugal, -0,5% for Austria and of 0,5% for Germany, vanishing subsequently. The impact is 
of 0,57% for Spain, but it is not statistically significant. The electoral effect is only felt after 
one quarter and by the end of the first year, with a 0,97% reduction in revenue.  
On the expenditure side, the immediate impact of upcoming elections is of -0,8% for 
Germany, 0,25% for France, 0,46% for Italy and 0,46% for Netherlands. This effect persists 
only for Netherlands and Italy, with the one-year impacts of 0,6% and 0,28%, respectively. 
By the end of first year, there is a 0,8% increase in spending for Portugal.  
In sum, although the inclusion of the electoral dummy has a statistically significant impact on 




Table 1. Estimated VAR Coefficients for the Electoral Dummy  
AT BE DE FR IT NL PT ES 
ΔT -0.005** -0.007** -0.005*** 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.015*** -.009*** 
ΔG 0.002  0.001 -0.008*** 0.002***  0.005*** 0.005 ** 0.01* 0.003 
Significance at *90%, **95% and ***99% confidence levels, respectively 
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Figure 1. Dynamic Responses of Government Spending and Revenue 20 quarters after 













































Figure 2. Comparison of Budgetary Dynamics between Models. 




























































Figure 3. Cumulative Dynamic Multipliers. Total Government Revenue.  
Responses in percentage points, presented with 95% confidence level interval bands. 
	  
 Table 2. Cumulative Multipliers on Total Government Revenue 
quarters BE DE ES AT PT 
0      -0,702 **      -0,523***    -0,571     -0,497 **     -1,512*** 
1 -0,231 -0,396  -0,817 ** -0,177 -0,430 
4 -0,263 -0,597  -0,971 ** -0,120 -0,885 
Significance at * 90% ** 95% and ***99% confidence levels, respectively. 























































Figure 4. Cumulative Dynamic Multipliers, Total Government Spending. 
Responses in percentage points, presented with 95% confidence level interval bands. 
 
 
Table 3. Cumulative Multipliers on Total Government Spending 
quarters DE FR IT NL PT 
0 -0,836*** 0,247 *** 0,456 ** 0,459 ** 0,962 
1 -0,702*** 0,104 0,316 ** 0,543 ** 0,563 
4 -0,527 0,130 0,283 ** 0,597** 0,757 *** 
Significance at * 90% ** 95% and ***99% confidence levels, respectively. 
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6. Conclusion and Final Remarks 
In this work project I have characterized the fiscal dynamics in EMU countries and tested 
whether existing differences are attenuated after considering political factors. As a result, two 
groups of countries are clearly identified. Countries that, when faced with a surprise negative 
shock in government revenue, cut spending, and countries that do the opposite and expand 
spending. The inclusion of an electoral dummy is statistically significant, yet it changes 
dynamics very little, either in terms of the sign or as far as the size of coefficient. It attenuates 
differences between countries that were already similar.  
This work adds something to the existing literature, as the use of time series methodologies to 
assess political hypothesis is not exploited thus far. The use of updated information on 
elasticities is another advantage. Finally, studies on fiscal dynamics tend to focus on the pre-
crisis period and do not take information after 2008 into account. If fiscal policy is 
determinant for stabilization purposes, it is of the utmost importance to assess its behavior 
precisely during periods of instability. The fact that Southern Europe countries’ reactions 
contrast with the others should also be highlighted, given the current political context. 
There are several avenues for future research that can complement the results presented here. 
The first one encompasses the treatment of the crisis period, which may be adding noise to the 
model, despite the stability tests that were performed. Intervention dummies have been used 
as a way to control for the changes in this period, yet other methodologies can be used in 
conjunction with tests for structural breaks in the VAR. Another possibility would be to 
estimate the model with an alternative sample excluding the crisis period, albeit the small 
dimension of the resulting sample. Finally, a more detailed account of fiscal dynamics would 
be interesting to analyze which components of government revenue and expenditure are more 
sensitive to election dates and how do they adjust.  
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Appendix 1. Data Definitions and Sources  
 
  




Quarterly total general government revenue, 
million euros, in real terms, seasonally adjusted 
 
Eurostat Quarterly non-financial accounts for general 





Quarterly total general government expenditure, 
million euros, in real terms, seasonally adjusted 
 
Eurostat Quarterly non-financial accounts for general 




Quarterly Gross domestic product, million euro, 
in real terms, seasonally adjusted 
 
Eurostat Quarterly national accounts: GDP and Main 
components (output, expenditure and income) (series 





Quarterly GDP deflator, 2010 reference year, 
seasonally adjusted 
 
Quarterly national accounts: Volume and Price 






Output elasticity of government revenue 
 
OECD New Tax and Expenditure Elasticity 







Output elasticity of government expenditure 
 
OECD New Tax and Expenditure Elasticity 
Estimates for EU Budget Surveillance, Table 9 




Parliament election dates 
 
Government composition 1: Relative power 
position based on cabinet posts 
 
Government composition 2: Relative power 
position based on parliamentary seat share 
 
 
Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – 
Government Composition 1960-2013. 
Adam Carr’s Election Archive, for election dates 
from 2013 to 2015 
 
 
Elasticities used in Estimation 
 
 AT BE DE FR IT NL PT ES 
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Appendix 2. Unit Root and Cointegration Tests  
 
 
Appendix 2.1 Unit Root Tests 
 
Country 	  
Augmented Dickey Fuller Phillips-Perron 






Ln G -1.157 -5.899*** -1.444 -16.625*** 
Ln T -2.992 -4.161*** -0.008 -9.263 *** 
Ln Y -1.685 -6.612*** -2.262  -5.380*** 
Belgium 
Ln G -2.334 -6.246*** -0.556  -9.194 *** 
Ln T -3.028 -5.854*** -1.427  -13.092*** 
Ln Y -1.393 -3.987***  -2.160 -3.966*** 
France 
Ln G -1.584 -5.244*** -1.310  -10.267*** 
Ln T -0.929 -6.683***  -1.216  -12.504*** 
Ln Y -1.895 -4.520*** -2.759 -4.744*** 
Germany 
Ln G -0.688 -5.810*** -1.031  -9.820*** 
Ln T -0.873 -3.964** -0.581   -7.435*** 
Ln Y -0.983 -3.987*** -1.168 -3.966*** 
Italy 
Ln G -1.034 -6.003*** -2.331 -11.208*** 
Ln T -2.112 -6.426** -3.108** -21.722*** 
Ln Y -2.256 -3.358** -2.303 -3.909*** 
Netherlands 
Ln G -1.734 -6.873** -1.449 -8.291*** 
Ln T -0.813 -4.369*** -1.100  -10.095*** 
Ln Y -1.537 -3.642*** -2.415 -4.223*** 
Portugal 
Ln G -2.186 -6.006*** -2.408 -13.569*** 
Ln T -2.109 -6.943*** -2.042 -11.844*** 
Ln Y -1.657 -3.378*** -2.512 -8.845*** 
Spain 
Ln G -1.759 -7.109** -2.051 -8.355***  
Ln T -2.447 -2.884** -1.974  -6.170*** 
Ln Y -1.762 -2.062** -4.103*** -9.403*** 
Rejection of null of nonstationarity at *** 99% and ** 95% confidence levels, respectively. 
Use of 61 observations for Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal; 49 observations for 
German and Spain; 53 observations for Austria. 
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Trace Test Prob Max eigenvalue Prob 
AT 31,191 0,127 19,701 0,111 
BE 21,166 0,347 10,827 0,665 
DE 26,457 0,116 16,251 0,211 
ES  35,064 0,011 18,691 0,106 
FR 25,804 0,135 18,397 0,116 
IT 23,789 0,210 13,295 0,423 
NL 26,800 0,107 17,193 0,163 
PT 21,868 0,306 11,765 0,571 
Null hypothesis: No-cointegration. MacKinnon-Haug-Michellis (1999) p-values.  
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Appendix 3. Tests for Model Adequacy 
 
Appendix 3.1. Tests for Model Adequacy – Baseline Model 
 
Normality of Residuals and Heteroskedasticity Tests 
 
 
AT BE DE ES FR IT NL PT 
(I) 0,790 0,507 0,289 0,805 0,381 0,193 0,309 0,977 
(II) 0,704 0,702 0,412 0,448 0,966 0,192 0,599 0,956 
  
(I) p-values for Joint Jarque-Bera Residual Normality test. Null hypothesis: Residuals are 
multivariate normal 
(II) p-values for Joint White's Residual Heteroskedasticity test.  Null hypothesis: No 





VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Test 
 
Lags AT BE DE ES FR IT NL PT 
1 0,237 0,416 0,457 0,500 0,666 0,966 0,683 0,275 
2 0,099 0,192 0,096 0,627 0,398 0,097 0,187 0,529 
3 0,516 0,312 0,107 0,230 0,181 0,146 0,072 0,199 
4 0,406 0,735 0,958 0,998 0,273 0,486 0,487 0,491 
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Appendix 3.2. Tests for Model Adequacy – Expanded Model 
 
Normality of Residuals and Heteroskedasticity Tests 
 
 
AT BE DE ES FR IT NL PT 
(I) 0,726 0,574 0,539 0,691 0,950 0,152 0,402 0,964 
(II) 0,631 0,836 0,424 0,586 0,978 0,09 0,492 0,961 
  
(I) p-values for Joint Jarque-Bera Residual Normality test. Null hypothesis: Residuals are multivariate 
normal 
 (II) p-values for Joint White's Residual Heteroskedasticity test.  Null hypothesis: No 







VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Test 
 
Lags AT BE DE ES FR IT NL PT 
1 0,130 0,437 0,129 0,645 0,382 0,934 0,914 0,274 
2 0,102 0,216 0,143 0,667 0,401 0,234 0,202 0,525 
3 0,964 0,371 0,052 0,081 0,231 0,083 0,155 0,178 
4 0,372 0,691 0,668 0,965 0,346 0,375 0,811 0,298 
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